

Development of the common security and defence policy following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty

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The Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted the own-initiative report by Roberto Gualtieri (S&D, IT) on the development of the common security and defence policy following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It emphasises that the new provisions on Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) introduced by the Lisbon Treaty provide a firm political statement of the Union's intention to act as a force for stability in the world.

Security and foreign policy: Members underline that the duty of consistency as defined by the Treaty and recent ECJ case protect both the primacy of the Community method and the distinguishing features of the CFSP, while encouraging the convergence of different policies and instruments in a comprehensive approach. They note that military assets can be also deployed in the event of natural and man-made disasters, as shown in practice by the EU Military Staff coordination of military capabilities in support of civilian-led humanitarian relief operations during the Pakistan floods in 2010. The committee expresses concern, therefore, that, more than one year after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, there are not yet clear signs of a post-Lisbon EU comprehensive approach enabling traditional procedural and institutional barriers to be overcome, while preserving the respective legal prerogatives when European citizens' security is at stake.

Members regret the unwillingness of the EU Member States to define a common position on the Libya crisis, on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 and on the ways to implement it. They express deep concern about the risk of considering ad hoc coalitions of the willing or bilateral cooperation as viable substitutes for CSDP, as no European State has the capacity to be a significant security and defence actor in the 21st century world. The committee insists that a common response to the developments in Libya is essential to formulate a credible new approach for our southern neighbourhood policy, and underlines that the elaboration of a strategy for the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa is yet another concrete opportunity to demonstrate the ability of the EU to act both on security challenges. The European Council is urged to carry out its task of identifying the strategic interests and political objectives of the EU by drawing up a European foreign policy strategy which should be based on real convergence of the different dimensions of EU external action and subject to regular review. Members call on the European Council and its President to set about this task by engaging in political dialogue with the European Parliament and to discuss Parliament's recommendations, maintaining that such a dialogue is required in the light of the new Treaty provisions. They also call on the Vice-President/High Representative (VP/HR) to interpret her role as a proactive one and to pursue a constructive dialogue with Parliament in the framework of the twofold effort to foster a political consensus among the Member States on the strategic directions and policy options for the CFSP and the CSDP, and to exploit the potential for the CFSP-CSDP to act synergistically with the other sectors of EU external action.

The report considers that the EEAS has a key role to play in bringing about an effective comprehensive approach based on full integration of the CSDP, the CFSP and the other dimensions of EU external action, notably development cooperation, trade and energy security policies. It regrets the fact that the provisional organisation chart of the EEAS does not include all existing units dealing with crisis response planning and programming, conflict prevention and peace-building with the CSDP structures in line with the Madrid agreement. The committee calls in this context for the organisation of regular meetings of a **crisis management board** to be composed of the CMPD, the CCPC, the EUMS, the EU SITCEN, the peace-

building, conflict prevention, mediation and security policy units, the Chair of the PSC, the geographical desks and other policy departments concerned. The Crisis Management Board should **provide the EEAS with unified contingency planning in relation to potential theatres and crisis scenarios** and also coordinate the use of the various financial instruments and deployment of capabilities available to the EU.

Security and defence: Members reaffirm that credible military capabilities are a sine qua non for an autonomous CSDP and that Member States need to provide them. They further stress that those military capabilities can be applied for diverse purposes, not least for civilian ones. The committee regrets the **sharp contrast** between the EUR 200 billion per year spent by the Member States on defence, the lack of means at the EU's disposal and the painfully protracted force generation conferences for EU military operations at a time when there are redundant capabilities and personnel. It deplores the fact that over more than twelve years the method of the force generation process has not yielded any de facto improvements regarding the quantity and quality of military capabilities available for CSDP missions. Members stress the need to evaluate the improvements of military capabilities on a regular basis, pointing out that there is an **increasing mismatch between growing demand from abroad and the resources that Member States make available to the Union**. They also call on Member States to develop greater transparency regarding their respective defence budgets. The committee also stresses the following:

- the CFSP and CSDP, should also lead to disarmament and non-proliferations of weapons ranging from small and light weapons (SALW) to nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles and the VP/HR should give this policy priority;
- economies of scale are not being achieved since there are widespread overlapping of defence programmes in the EU, such as the more than 20 armoured vehicle programmes, the 6 different attack submarine programmes, the 5 ground-to-air missile programmes and the 3 combat aircraft programmes – this means limited economic resources are wasted, hampers the competitiveness of the whole security-related industrial sector in Europe.

The committee calls for an extraordinary European Council meeting to be given over to European security and defence, and renews its call for the drafting of a **White Paper** on European security and defence.

Members recognise the soundness of the **Battlegroups**, but call for the concept and the structure of the Battlegroups, which have so far never been deployed, to be carefully reviewed for an increased degree of flexibility and efficiency. They believe that consideration could be given to specialising one of the two Battlegroups in niche capabilities and/or capabilities suited to low-intensity conflicts entailing mixed civilian-military tasks. The **operating costs should be charged to the ATHENA mechanism**, which is due to be reviewed under the Polish Presidency;

The report recommends that the **ATHENA mechanism be reformed with a view to rationalising and increasing the proportion of common costs** (at present estimated to be about 10%) so as to make for fairer burden-sharing in military operations, in which the participants in a mission, who already bear a heavy responsibility in terms of risks and costs, are obliged in the current situation to undertake a further economic responsibility. It calls for the **establishment of the start-up fund for preparatory activities in the lead-up to military operations** to speed up the disbursement of funds, and for this measure to be covered by the ATHENA mechanism review proposal.

Security in partnership: Members maintain that the trend towards multipolarity in the international system and the establishment of strategic partnerships must be encompassed within an active commitment to **promoting multilateralism**. It calls on those Member States which have seats on the UN Security Council to defend common positions and interests of the EU and to ask the HR/VP to ensure EU representation in that body and persuade Member States to agree on a rotation system, which will ensure a permanent member's seat for the EU on the UNSC. Members recall that, in addition to partnerships with other international organisations such as the UN, NATO and the African Union, cooperation with individual third countries should be enhanced in the context of the CSDP. Experience shows that third

countries can bring important assets, human resources and expertise to CSDP missions, such as in the context of EUFOR Chad/CAR, for which Russia provided much-needed helicopters. The involvement of third countries can also enhance the legitimacy of CSDP operations and help set up a broader security dialogue with important partners while remaining committed to promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law.