Economic governance: requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. 'Six pack'

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OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK on economic governance reform in the European Union.

On 29 November 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Council for an opinion on a package of six legislative proposals aiming to strengthen economic governance.

The ECB considers that the Commission proposals represent an important broadening and strengthening of the EU economic and budgetary surveillance framework and go some way in improving enforcement in the euro area. However, **they fall short of the necessary quantum leap in the surveillance of the euro area, which the ECB deems necessary to ensure its stability and smooth functioning**.

The ECB calls on the EU legislator and the Member States to take advantage of the ongoing legislative process to strengthen the economic governance package to the maximum allowed under the current Treaties. In addition, the EU should consider at a certain point in time Treaty reform to further strengthen economic governance.

The ECB makes the following observations:

Insufficient automaticity: for the ECB, insufficient automaticity is a fundamental flaw of the Commission proposals. In this vein, the ECB proposes that the EU legislator consider reverting the changes to the Stability and Growth Pact introduced in 2005 which increased the leeway allowed to Member States in respect of their obligations under the Pact.

Furthermore, the ECB states that there are several elements showing insufficient automaticity in the Commission proposals which should be reconsidered:

- the draft budgetary surveillance procedure provides the possibility for Member States to depart from the adjustment path towards the medium-term budgetary objective in case of a severe economic downturn of a general nature;
- the draft budgetary enforcement procedure provides that the Council will review interest-bearing deposits, non-interest bearing deposits and fines it imposes, on the grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned;
- lastly, the Commission’s obligation to take into account discussions within the Council as a condition for the continuation by the Commission of any procedure should be excluded.
- In addition, the ECB recommends increasing automaticity by means of **adding reverse Council qualified majority voting whenever possible.**

Additional political and reputational measures: these measuresshould be established in the draft budgetary surveillance procedure and EDP, including Member State reporting obligations and reports from the Council to the European Council. In addition, the Commission, in liaison with the ECB if it deems it appropriate, where euro area Member States or ERM II participant Member States are concerned, should conduct missions to Member States not complying with Council recommendations.

Assessing compliance with the reference value for the government debt ratio: while all relevant factors should be considered when the Commission prepares a report on the existence of an excessive debt ratio and while particular consideration should be given to the effect of guarantees issued by the Member States under the European Financial Stability Facility or eventually under the future European Stability Mechanism (ESM), all these factors should only be considered where the government debt ratio is declining over a three-year horizon according to the Commission's forecasts. Any relevant mitigating factors should never lead to an assessment that a Member State has no excessive debt ratio where its debt ratio exceeds the reference value and is projected to be on an increasing path.

Procedure concerning the draft budgetary surveillance procedure: the ECB recommends that:

- sufficient progress towards the medium-term objective should be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures;
- the growth rate of government expenditure should normally not exceed a projected reference medium- term growth rate of potential gross domestic product (GDP) growth;
- the projected medium-term rate of potential GDP growth should be calculated according to the common methodology used by the Commission;
- taking into account the impact of the structure of economic growth on revenue growth.

Macroeconomic surveillance procedure: the ECB strongly welcomes the introduction of a macroeconomic surveillance procedure, which closes an important lacuna in the economic governance framework. This new procedure should concentrate firmly on euro area Member States experiencing sustained losses of competitiveness and large current account deficits. The scope of the procedure should by defining the term 'imbalances' address an open list of situations to be prevented by the procedure.In addition, the macroeconomic surveillance procedure should be determined by transparent and effective trigger mechanisms.

Fines: as to the interest accruals from the non-remunerated deposits and the fines imposed on euro area Member States under the Commission proposals, they should be assigned to the ESM to be created in 2013, with an appropriate transition solution until its creation.

Independent advisory body: the ECB sees also the need to establish an advisory body of persons of recognised competence in economic and fiscal matters to prepare an independent annual report addressed to the Union institutions on compliance by the Council and the Commission, including Eurostat, with their obligations under Articles 121 and 126 of the Treaty and under the procedures addressed in the Commission proposals.

Draft directive on the budgetary frameworks:

- the ECB also considers that all Member States should in any case be required to ensure independent monitoring, analysis and validation of the key elements of their budgetary frameworks. All these measures should not prevent Member States from developing stronger budgetary frameworks, such as by including rules prohibiting general government structural deficits above a certain threshold of GDP;
- the ECB recommends highlighting the importance of transparent national forecasts and methodologies for their preparation. At the same time, the Commission's forecasts have to play a central role in benchmarking national forecasts;
- regarding its effectiveness, the directive should refer expressly to costs imposed on national authorities for non-compliance with numerical fiscal rules, including both non-financial measures and financial sanctions at national level. Obligations to redeem in the medium-term debt exceeding amounts tolerated by the fiscal framework should be included;

- regarding statistics, the ECB favours an increase in the timeliness and reliability of the annual and quarterly government accounts reported to the Commission under Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 on the European system of national and regional accounts in the Community. Regarding statistics in future legislation, the ECB notes that EU legislative action is required for the 'European statistics code of practice' to become legally binding, while, in the meantime, the complete implementation of the code is accelerated, in particular regarding quality and the mandates for data collection.

Lastly, **Eurostat powers in assessing and monitoring the EDP notifications should be further strengthened** with a focus on proactive measures to enhance the quality of government statistics.