Basic information

2001/2214(COS) COS - Procedure on a strategy paper (historic)	Procedure completed
Euratom Safeguards Office. Report 1999-2000 **Subject** 3.60.04 Nuclear energy, industry and safety	

Key players

European Parliament

Committee responsible	Rapporteur	Appointed
ITRE Industry, External Trade, Research, Energy	RÜBIG Paul (PPE-DE)	18/09/2001

Committee for opinion	Rapporteur for opinion	Appointed
ENVI Environment, Public Health, Consumer Policy	The committee decided not to give an opinion.	

Council of the European Union

European Commission

Commission DG	Commissioner
Energy and Transport	

Key events

Date	Event	Reference	Summary
26/07/2001	Non-legislative basic document published	COM(2001)0436	Summary
12/11/2001	Committee referral announced in Parliament		
22/05/2002	Vote in committee		Summary
22/05/2002	Committee report tabled for plenary	A5-0196/2002	
01/07/2002	Debate in Parliament		
02/07/2002	Decision by Parliament	T5-0346/2002	Summary
02/07/2002	End of procedure in Parliament		
12/11/2003	Final act published in Official Journal		

Technical information	
Procedure reference	2001/2214(COS)
Procedure type	COS - Procedure on a strategy paper (historic)
Procedure subtype	Commission strategy paper
Legal basis	Rules of Procedure EP 148
Stage reached in procedure	Procedure completed
Committee dossier	ITRE/5/15370

Documentation gateway

European Parliament

Document type	Committee	Reference	Date	Summary
Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading		A5-0196/2002	22/05/2002	
Text adopted by Parliament, single reading		T5-0346/2002 OJ C 271 12.11.2003, p. 0030-0173 E	02/07/2002	Summary

European Commission

Document type	Reference	Date	Summary
Non-legislative basic document	COM(2001)0436	26/07/2001	Summary
Follow-up document	COM(2002)0566	17/10/2002	Summary
Follow-up document	COM(2003)0764	10/12/2003	Summary

Euratom Safeguards Office. Report 1999-2000

2001/2214(COS) - 10/12/2003 - Follow-up document

This document comprises of the report from the Commission on the operation of Euratom Safeguards in 2002. It states that 2002 was a pivotal year for Euratom Safeguards. During 2001 the Commission had appointed a High Level Experts Group (HLEG) to examine the mission and the means of the former Euratom Safeguards Office. On the basis of their final report the Commission adopted a new Mission Statement for the former Office and instructed that it be fully integrated within DG TREN. To this end on 26 June 2002 two new Directorates were created: Directorate H Nuclear Safety and Safeguards, and Directorate I Nuclear Inspection. The adoption of the new Mission Statement will entail significant changes in the approaches employed for the execution of Euratom Safeguards controls. Therefore structures were created to provide new concepts and guidance in order to progress the introduction of new approaches. Internally, working groups of experienced personnel from H and I were set up. Externally, an advisory group of senior experts from the Safeguards community, SAGES, was established. In March 2002, the proposed new Regulation on the application of Euratom Safeguards was adopted by the Commission and submitted to the Council for approval. The new Regulation is intended to update the currently in force Regulation 3227/76 in line with legal and technical developments, in particular the Additional Protocol to the Agreements between the Member States, the Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency, modern data transmission techniques and a consistent Safeguards policy on waste. Discussions with the Council have progressed reasonably well and it is hoped that the new Regulation will enter into force at the end of 2003. The Additional Protocols to the Safeguards Agreements between the Community, Member States and the IAEA had been ratified by 11 of the 15 Member States by the end of 2002. In the meantime exercises were arranged together with the IAEA and some Member States to investigate the practicalities of implementation and to develop the necessary implementation procedures. A dedicated database is being developed for follow up of the Additional Protocols when they are in force. In order to increase transparency, a Stakeholders' seminar attended by 110 representatives of Member States and nuclear installations was held to brief participants on the implementation of the new Regulation and the Additional Protocols as well as upon the new missions of Euratom Safeguards. In a similar spirit of greater transparency, all the major nuclear installations of the European Union were invited to complete a questionnaire on their perception of the image and quality of Euratom Safeguards. The generally positive replies are considered

as encouraging. It is expected that enlargement will not pose any major practical difficulties. The project to prepare software and hardware tools for nuclear material reporting for the enlargement states had entered its final phase by the end of 2002. At the end of 2002 the total amount of Plutonium under Euratom Safeguards was 569 tonnes, an 11 tonne increase compared with the end of 2001. Similarly the total amount of Uranium under Euratom Safeguards increased to 318 710 tonnes. Despite the increase in the amounts of material under control, careful streamlining andprioritisation of inspection activities allowed a 5% reduction in inspection-days compared to 2001. Reports made by the operators of installations on flows and inventories of nuclear materials in accordance with Regulation 3227/76 were processed and checked. In total more than 1 million lines of data were received, mostly in electronic format. All errors and inconsistencies detected were satisfactorily corrected by the operators concerned. In turn Euratom Safeguards furnished the IAEA with the accountancy reports which the Community supplies in fulfilment of its obligations under the Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. All reports were supplied on time and correctly formatted. A number of discrepancies and inconsistencies were detected by inspection activities during 2002. However, subsequent investigation led to the conclusion that no diversion of nuclear material had taken place. Similarly, data analysis performed at Headquarters revealed no evidence for the diversion of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Implementation Report of the IAEA for 2002 concluded that there was no evidence of diversion of nuclear material or misuse of facilities or equipment under IAEA Safeguards. Lastly, concerning the budget for 2002, the specific operational appropriations in the EU Budget for the Euratom Safeguards represented EUR 19.1 Mio. From that amount EUR 18.9 Mio (99.1%) were actually committed.

Euratom Safeguards Office. Report 1999-2000

2001/2214(COS) - 26/07/2001 - Non-legislative basic document

PURPOSE : to present the report on the operation of the Euratom safeguards office 1999-2000. CONTENT : the task of the Euratom Safeguards Office is to ensure that within the European Union nuclear material is not diverted from its intended use and that safeguarding obligations assumed by the Community under an agreement with a third state or an international organisation are complied with. This document describes the role and the legal basis of the Euratom Safeguards Office and reports on its operation for the period 1999-2000. It also provides some information on current developments and includes an outlook for the future. Firstly, Safeguards is the set of measures performed by the controlling authority to verify that nuclear material and equipment are not diverted from their intended (peaceful) uses, e.g. are not used to produce nuclear weapons. The aim is to allow the use of nuclear energy whilst ensuring that civil nuclear materials remains in peaceful nuclear programmes. Its legal basis and scope is defined in the treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community signed in 1957. It has the necessary infrastructure for data handling, evaluation and inspection support. Co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assures effective and efficient safeguards under Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the European Union. Secondly, the period under review was characterised by a steady increase in quantity and sensitivity of nuclear material under safeguards in the European Union. To cope with such an evolution, the Euratom Safeguards Office streamlined, improved, modernised and upgraded, on a regular basis, its methods, equipment and systems (including information technology). Overall, as a result of its activities in 1999 and 2000, and subsequent evaluations, the Euratom Safeguards Office did not find any indication that nuclear materials were diverted from their intended peaceful uses. The "Materials Unaccounted For" (MUF), which is one of the indicators of diversion was acceptable for nearly all the installations. Small discrepancies found during inspections or the material evaluation were rectified or are still being investigated with the operators concerned.

Euratom Safeguards Office. Report 1999-2000

2001/2214(COS) - 17/10/2002 - Follow-up document

A re-evaluation of the Euratom Safeguards Office (ESO) missions related to the implementation of Chapter VII of the Euratom Treaty has been conducted in the second half of the year 2001. It led to recommendations made to the Commission on ESO's objectives, working methods, and internal structure and management policy. A changing environment for the nuclear industries' activities, but also in the legal framework in which safeguards are applied, led ESO to take the initiative of preparing a new draft regulation, replacing Regulation (Euratom) 3227/76. Reporting by the nuclear installation operators on nuclear material flows and inventories was fulfilled in compliance with Euratom treaty requirements. All data was checked and clerical errors or inconsistencies corrected. Verification activities conducted by ESO inspection staff led to the conclusion that, apart from some discrepancies between evaluations carried out by operators and ESO inspectors, which are in the process of being solved, no diversion of nuclear materials from its intended use was established. Effective co-operation between ESO and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the territory of the EU resulted in confirmation - reflected in the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) 2000 issued by the IAEA - that no evidence of nuclear material diversion or misuse of equipment or facilities placed under the safeguards in the EU was found. In addition to its global conclusions, the SIR 2000 identified some areas for improvement concerning different technical aspects and verification procedures. The need for enhanced co-operation with the IAEA for the implementation of the Additional Protocols to the existing safeguards agreements was clearly stated. Founded on the legal bases of the Euratom Treaty, ESO activities are financed by two different budget appropriations, one concerning general functioning of ESO as any other service of the Commission and the second one related to specific operational costs in the field of nuclear safeguards. Details on the way in which the budget was spent in 2001 are provided in this report. As an overall conclusion of the Annual Report 2001, the Commission states that the objectives defined for ESO's activities as set out in Chapter VII of the Euratom Treaty were satisfactorily met.

Euratom Safeguards Office. Report 1999-2000

2001/2214(COS) - 02/07/2002 - Text adopted by Parliament, single reading

The European Parliament adopted a resolution drafted by Paul RUBIG (EPP-ED, Austria) on the Commission's report. (Please refer to the document dated 22/05/02.) Parliament called for greater clarification from the ESO of cases where discrepancies were found during inspections or material balance evaluations. The ESO was asked to give further explanations and justifications for the margin of error built into the "material unaccounted for"

(MUF) figures. These margins should be significantly reduced over time to increase the accuracy of accounting for fissile material. Parliament encouraged the Commission to propose a directive to fix a reference framework for all activities of auditing over time to increase the accuracy of accounting for fissile material.