








Basic information	
2004/0203(COD) COD - Ordinary legislative procedure (ex-codecision procedure) Directive	Procedure lapsed or withdrawn
Industrial property: legal protection of designs Subject 3.50.16 Industrial property, European patent, Community patent, design and pattern	

Key players				
European Parliament	Committee responsible		Rapporteur	Appointed
	 JURI	Legal Affairs	LEHNE Klaus-Heiner (PPE-DE)	26/10/2004
	Committee for opinion		Rapporteur for opinion	Appointed
	 ECON	Economic and Monetary Affairs	KLINZ Wolf (ALDE)	30/11/2004
	 IMCO	Internal Market and Consumer Protection (Associated committee)	MEDINA ORTEGA Manuel (PSE)	18/04/2005
	Council of the European Union	Council configuration		Meetings
Competitiveness (Internal Market, Industry, Research and Space)		2832	2007-11-22	
European Commission	Commission DG		Commissioner	
	Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union		BARNIER Michel	

Key events			
Date	Event	Reference	Summary
14/09/2004	Legislative proposal published	COM(2004)0582 	Summary
14/12/2004	Committee referral announced in Parliament, 1st reading		
12/05/2005	Referral to associated committees announced in Parliament		
20/11/2007	Vote in committee, 1st reading		Summary

22/11/2007	Debate in Council		
22/11/2007	Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading	A6-0453/2007	
11/12/2007	Debate in Parliament		
12/12/2007	Decision by Parliament, 1st reading	T6-0609/2007	Summary
12/12/2007	Results of vote in Parliament		
21/05/2014	Proposal withdrawn by Commission		Summary

Technical information	
Procedure reference	2004/0203(COD)
Procedure type	COD - Ordinary legislative procedure (ex-codecision procedure)
Procedure subtype	Legislation
Legislative instrument	Directive
Legal basis	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union TFEU 114-p1
Stage reached in procedure	Procedure lapsed or withdrawn
Committee dossier	JURI/6/24446

Documentation gateway				
European Parliament				
Document type	Committee	Reference	Date	Summary
Committee opinion	ECON	PE357.767	13/07/2005	
Committee draft report		PE380.965	06/12/2006	
Amendments tabled in committee		PE384.284	02/02/2007	
Amendments tabled in committee		PE394.082	18/09/2007	
Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading		A6-0453/2007	22/11/2007	
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading		T6-0609/2007	12/12/2007	Summary
European Commission				
Document type	Reference	Date	Summary	
Legislative proposal	COM(2004)0582 	14/09/2004	Summary	
Document attached to the procedure	SEC(2004)1097 	14/09/2004	Summary	
Commission response to text adopted in plenary	SP(2008)0411	23/01/2008		
Other institutions and bodies				

Institution/body	Document type	Reference	Date	Summary
EESC	Economic and Social Committee: opinion, report	CES0691/2005 OJ C 286 17.11.2005, p. 0008-0011	08/06/2005	

Additional information		
Source	Document	Date
European Commission	EUR-Lex	

Industrial property: legal protection of designs

2004/0203(COD) - 12/12/2007 - Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading

The European Parliament adopted a legislative resolution based on the report drafted by Klaus-Heiner **LEHNE** (EPP-ED, DE), and made some amendments, in the first reading of the co-decision procedure, to the proposal for a directive amending Directive 98/71/EC on the legal protection of designs.

It should be recalled that the proposed directive relates to design protection of spare parts intended to restore the appearance of complex products. It seeks to achieve the complete liberalisation of the secondary market in spare parts.

The main amendments are as follows:

transition period: Member States under whose existing legislation protection as a design exists for a design which constitutes a component part of a complex product used within the meaning of Article 12(1) of Directive 98/71/EC for the purpose of the repair of that complex product so as to restore its original appearance, may retain that design protection for five years after the entry into force of the Directive. This measure stems from an agreement reached between the political groups to facilitate the transition to a new system;

consumer information: consumers must be duly informed about the origin of the product used for the repair by the use of a marking, such as a trade mark or a trade name, or in another appropriate form so that they can make an informed choice between competing products offered for use in effecting the repair. Moreover, Article 14(1) of Directive 98/71/EC shall not apply where the primary purpose of putting the component part on the market is other than the repair of the complex product.

Article 14(1) shall apply only in respect of visible component parts in the after market once the complex product is marketed in the primary market by the holder of the design right therein or with his consent.

Parliament also introduced a new recital stating that Directive 2007/46/EC establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles, includes provisions for the testing of spare parts manufactured by independent producers to ensure that they meet safety and environmental criteria and the new procedures which it prescribes will provide enhanced consumer safeguards in a fully deregulated market.

Industrial property: legal protection of designs

2004/0203(COD) - 14/09/2004 - Legislative proposal

PURPOSE : amending EU Directive on the legal protection of designs in order to create an internal market for spare parts.

PROPOSED ACT : Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council.

CONTENT : the European Commission is presenting this proposal in a bid to harmonise and complete the internal market for spare parts by adopting the liberalisation route for opening up the market. At the same time it seeks to retain an element of incentive to invest in design since the proposed amendment will not affect design protection for new parts incorporated at the manufacturing stage of a complex product.

Currently, the internal market offers consumers a single market for new cars but no single market for their spare parts. For example, automotive spare parts cannot be freely produced and traded within the Community. This is to the detriment of the consumer and those SMEs seeking a foothold in the spare parts market. Studies indicate that in countries relying on design protection for spare parts, prices are between 6.4% and 10.3% higher. In addition, under the current situation, whereby a mixed protection regime is in place, trade distortions are created.

When EU Directive 98/71/EC on the legal protection of design was adopted there was no agreement on how to liberalise the after market for spare parts. As a result, article 14 of the Directive stipulated that Member States shall maintain their existing laws and may change those provisions only in a

way that liberalises the spare parts market. It is this article, which the current proposal is seeking to amend. The amendment introduces provisions for the full liberalisation of the market for spare parts. The repairs clause does not limit the right of design holders but it does prevent the existence of monopolies on the spare parts market. The design right on the appearance of a primary product will not be extended to the product in the secondary market. In addition, paragraph 2 of the amended Article provides for Member States to ensure that consumers are duly informed as to the origin of spare parts allowing them to make an informed choice between competing parts.

The European Commission suggests that the proposal, if adopted, will be beneficial to consumers, it will help create of climate of competitiveness amongst the business sector – particularly independent spare parts producers, it will help employment and it will help promote health and safety issues relating to spare parts.

Industrial property: legal protection of designs

2004/0203(COD) - 14/09/2004 - Document attached to the procedure

COMMISSION'S IMPACT ASSESSMENT

For further information regarding the context of this issue, please refer to the summary of the Commission's initial proposal COM(2004)0582 concerning a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 98/71/EC on the legal protection of designs.

1- POLICY OPTIONS AND IMPACTS

Given the impossibility of reaching a voluntary agreement by industry itself, the Commission decided to follow instead a regulatory approach and to propose an amendment to Directive 98/71/EC to liberalise the aftermarket in spare parts. With this in mind, the Commission launched an impact study of the possible options to liberalise the aftermarket in spare parts. The study focused on the automotive sector, given the importance of the economic impact in this sector. However its conclusions and subsequent harmonisation at European level will apply to any sector where replacement and repair of complex products occurs. The study examined how four alternative sets of legal rights in respect of design protection would translate into future impacts on competition, community industrial sectors and consumers, against a baseline corresponding to the present situation.

1.1- Option 1 - Present situation, "Status quo": in some EU Member States, spare parts do fully benefit from design protection, whereas in others, the use of a design protected product for the purposes of repair and maintenance is allowed ("repairs clause"). In only one Member State, design protection for spare parts is term-restricted and combined with a market shares (EU-15): 50% of the automotive aftermarket enjoy free competition, 24% are covered by design protection, in another 24% there is supposed to be a free market and in 2% there is a combined solution. The continuation of the status quo is considered to be the most risky option of all, as legal certainty is key for the smooth functioning of the internal market.

1.2- Option 2 - "Full liberalisation," i.e. no design protection of spare parts: this option assumes a revision of Directive 98/71/EC that would remove design protection for must-match parts across the European Union. The liberalisation option promises net benefits in many respects without serious drawbacks. It would improve the functioning of the Internal Market and would allow for more competition in the aftermarket and access and participation of SMEs in this market. The consumer would benefit from more choice and lower reasonable prices. Besides the increase of legal certainty, it would also have as a consequence the simplification of daily lives of administrations, courts, companies, especially SMEs and consumers.

1.3- Option 3 - A system seeking a short term of design protection: under this alternative, design protection for spare parts shall be effective for only a limited period of time. After this period, the spare parts could no longer be covered by design protection and any third party would be free to produce and/or market them. The rationale for this option would be to allow VM (vehicle markers) a certain time to recover their costs and appropriate profit from their "intellectual effort". A limited term of protection would risk making the spare parts market uninteresting for independent producers as the market share left after the expiry of the protection might not be worth the necessary investment. In this case this option would have *de facto* the same impact on the market as full protection.

1.4- Option 4 - A remuneration system for the use of protected designs, including the appropriate level for remuneration: in the context of this option, independent producers could produce spare parts in exchange for a reasonable remuneration to be paid to the holder of the design right.

1.5- Option 5 - A combination of both the systems previously mentioned: a short term of design protection and a remuneration system.

The options including a remuneration system seem not to be practical. They appear to be too complicated and administratively costly without promising significant benefits in comparison to both the status quo and the other options.

CONCLUSION: after the extended impact assessment of all the above options, the Commission is of the opinion that **the option not to extend design protection to spare parts in the aftermarket is the only effective one to achieve complete harmonisation in the internal market on the principle of liberalisation, in line with its intention in the original proposal in 1993 and the spirit of the Block Exemption Regulation.** Moreover, it fits with the spirit of the transitory agreement on the design regime on spare parts agreed in Directive 98/71. The extended impact assessment showed that the liberalisation provides the greatest net benefits compared to both the status quo and the other options considered.

IMPACTS

As there are no significant environmental and social impacts, impacts will be analysed in detail only with respect to certain aspects of the socio-economic dimension, namely, benefit for the consumer, safety, competition and employment, market behaviour, legal certainty and innovation.

Environmental impact: the proposal would not have any major effect on the environmental impact of production of spare parts. It is, however, expected that the level of production increases as demand should increase with falling prices. Yet, it is impossible to assess the environmental impact of this or of the possible changes in trade patterns.

Impact on consumer and prices: it is difficult to exactly foresee in quantitative terms how a liberalised aftermarket would develop. However it is interesting to compare spare part prices in EU markets. The situation in the US market was also examined. Using regression analysis, it was demonstrated that spare parts are more expensive in Member States with design protection in the aftermarket than in Member States without protection.

It is considered that these price differences across countries with and without design protection for spare parts underestimate the price differences in prices between OEM (original equipment manufacturers) and independent manufacturers for similar parts. Given that the market share of vehicle manufacturers is around 85%, this means that even in countries without protection, most of the parts sold are OEM-made. Hence, the average price in those countries is heavily influenced by OEM prices.

It can be seen from the UK and the US experience, even after liberalisation, OE manufacturers will probably keep a sizeable market share. However, price reductions at least similar to those presented above could be expected in Member States that currently enforce design protection. Prices are also likely to fall in other Member States, but only insofar as independent manufacturers compete in price and increase their market share in those countries.

Impact on Innovation: the core aim of any intellectual property right (IPR) is to encourage innovation. The protection of an IPR should enable the right holder to recover the expenses he had to bear for the invention/innovation. In addition to that, it should allow for an adequate reward of his efforts. This argument is of course also valid in the case of design protection. It is inherently difficult to precisely assess the impact of IPR protection on the innovative activity of an economy. It is equally difficult to assess the additional revenue a right holder can generate from an IPR. IPRs do not guarantee that the right holder can amortize his investment. They only give him a zone of exclusivity, but the "reward" is exclusively fixed by the market as a result of consumer preference. This preference is exercised at the primary market (new cars) when the car is sold but not at the spare parts market, where the consumer has no choice regarding the spare part, it must match to the original. In the latter case, the vehicle manufacturer as a right holder, instead of getting a design premium (primary market), receives a monopoly premium.

It is even more difficult to estimate the effect of design protection for spare parts on the innovative activities of manufacturers, their costs and their profits. Two factors should be taken into account. First, the true purpose of creating car designs is to sell cars; here, design has an impact on consumer behaviour, in the spare parts sector, it does not. Thus, vehicle manufacturers will certainly continue to use design as a marketing instrument for their core business irrespective of whether or not there is protection in the aftermarket. Secondly, the available evidence suggests that the investment in the design of the outer skin of a car is relatively modest.

The Commission concludes that the impact of liberalisation on innovation is at any rate negligible.

Impact on employment: shifts in the market shares of spare parts producers would necessarily be reflected in employment. However, this is not necessarily a one-to-one matching. The net impact depends rather on relative labour productivity levels. For EU employment it is, of course, also relevant where the production is located. In addition, to estimate the overall impact on employment dynamic effects have to be taken into account as well as impacts on other markets and especially the distribution level. These impacts have to be isolated from other influences like global competition and outsourcing. Independent of the design protection regime the respective producer, be it a VM, an OE supplier or an independent producer, will allocate its production facilities as efficient as possible.

The liberalisation of the aftermarket might benefit SMEs in the EU as a continued lack of harmonised rules in this area is burdensome for companies. In contrast to car manufacturers, most producers of spare parts are SMEs. Liberalisation might hence encourage investment by independent producers in an open aftermarket for spare parts.

Impact on safety: in its paper, the Commission states 'Prima facie, design and safety are completely unrelated issues'. The issues of the safety, quality and structural integrity of spare parts have been raised repeatedly. They are clearly crucial for consumers. However, design protection is meant to reward the intellectual effort of the creator of a design and to protect the appearance of the product, but not its technical functions or quality. These characteristics could be subject respectively to patent or trademark protection, but cannot be the subject of design protection.

Impact on competitiveness: the abolition of design protection in the aftermarket would impact on all car producers in the EU market in the same way as design protection can be obtained independent of the origin of the product. That is while imports into Member States with design protection would lose this advantage, exports of EU producers to third countries would not be affected in any way. Therefore, the argument that liberalisation would have a negative impact on the competitiveness of EU car manufacturers vis-à-vis producers in third countries cannot be sustained.

As concerns the aftermarket itself, liberalisation would open business opportunities to independent spare parts producers. While the car industry argues that the market would be immediately dominated by large producers from third countries, ECAR is more confident that the specialised European producers will be able to compete in the market. The discussion on competitiveness should also take the business opportunities into account which the liberalisation will open for European producers in the spare parts markets in third countries without design protection.

Impact on legal certainty: all options would improve the situation concerning legal certainty compared to the status quo. However, different periods of protection for spare parts and original designs in the "term-limited protection" and the combined option could create confusion. A remuneration system could lead to legal uncertainty in the sense that it might result in frequent and lengthy litigation cases.

Impact on market structure: the harmonisation of the law in the EU by the denial of design protection for spare parts would complete the internal market and allow full competition. In countries where design protection in the aftermarket is not possible, new entrants may enter the market from both inside and outside Europe. The extent of this effect depends on both, the ability of these new entrants to gain confidence of insurers and, ultimately, the consumer; and on the European suppliers' ability to remain innovative and competitive in order to keep in pace with globalization. However, this is a trend that is unrelated, or only very remotely, to the issue of design protection, and much more to global competition.

2- FOLLOW-UP

This proposal will be implemented by its transposition into national laws. A revision clause and analysis of its implementation is already foreseen in Article 18 of Directive 98/71.